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  An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different 
multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-
price with endogenous supply.  We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and 
the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium 
strategies.  The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than 
are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous 
experimental results the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue.   
Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible 
supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply.  
Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in 
significantly more symmetric allocations. 1.  Introduction 
 
Many countries use auctions to sell their Treasury securities.  While the 
institutional details of the auctions differ in a variety of subtle ways across countries, 
most use a variant of either a uniform or a discriminatory pricing rule.  In recent years 
there are examples of countries switching from the discriminatory to the uniform-price 
format (e.g., the United States) and examples of countries making the reverse change 
(e.g., France), indicating that the choice between these mechanisms remains an unsettled 
issue.
1 
We use the experimental economics laboratory to examine some of the tradeoffs 
implicit in the choice over auction designs.  Our experiment compares the two most 
common auctions (discriminatory and uniform-price) in a multi-unit, common value 
setting.  The auctions are evaluated along the dimensions of average revenue, symmetry 
of allocations across bidders, and their susceptibility to collusion.  We also study the 
impact on auction performance of an aspect of auction design that has only recently 
received theoretical attention: allowing the seller to endogenously select the quantity sold 
in a uniform-price auction after observing the bids. 
Despite theoretical progress in analyzing multi-unit auctions, definitive 
comparisons of the expected revenue and other measures of the performance of 
alternative auction formats are difficult to accomplish.  The strategy space in these games 
is large and there often exist multiple equilibria.  In addition, typical features of Treasury 
auctions make it appropriate to model them as a repeated game.  Consequently, the 
propensity of bidders to engage in tacit collusion or outright cooperation across the 
                                                           
1 See Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997) for cross-country evidence on the design of Treasury auctions. 
  1different mechanisms is a primary aspect of auction performance.
2  All of the foregoing 
issues make the experimental laboratory a natural direction in which to turn. 
  Much of the debate on Treasury auction design focuses on the revenue 
implications of the alternate pricing rules.  Milton Friedman (1960) and others advocated 
a switch by the U.S. Treasury from its discriminatory format to a uniform-price auction.  
Friedman argued that, bidders being awarded allocations at prices greater than the stop-
out price, (1) had the effect of driving out unsophisticated bidders, (2) increased 
incentives for bid shading in response to the winner’s curse, and (3) increased the 
incentive for participating bidders to collude. 
The theory of multi-unit auctions has identified an added dimension to the 
problem of Treasury auction design.  This work shows that there exist non-cooperative 
equilibria under the uniform-price format that support outcomes in which the auction’s 
stop-out price is much lower than the value of the asset offered for sale.  Since the 
discriminatory auction does not allow such equilibria, the question becomes whether the 
more severe winner’s curse and potential susceptibility to collusion of the discriminatory 
format are less costly to the auctioneer than the “collusive-looking” outcomes that are 
possible with uniform-pricing.
3 
Recent theoretical work also examines the implications of allowing the seller the 
option of reducing the quantity sold after observing the bids in uniform-price auctions.  
Back and Zender (2001) show that having the seller retain this right severely restricts the 
                                                           
2 Klemperer (2002) argues that most issues in the auction literature are of second-order importance for 
practical auction design.  Discouraging collusive, entry-deterring, and predatory behavior are the key 
concerns he identifies. 
 
3 For example, see Wilson (1979), Back and Zender (1993), Ausubel and Cramton (1996) or Wang and 
Zender (2002) for theoretical results on strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions. 
 
  2strategic advantage provided to bidders in a uniform-price auction.  The uniform-price 
auction with reducible supply may therefore enjoy the relative advantages of uniform-
pricing without its potential costs. 
To explore these arguments, we ask whether the use of discriminatory pricing or 
reducible supply is a more effective way to eliminate the bidders’ strategic advantage in 
multi-unit auctions.  We examine this question by comparing actual bidding behavior 
with equilibrium bidding strategies.  We also ask whether the discriminatory auction is 
more susceptible to collusion than the uniform-price auction.  Since Treasury auctions 
commonly involve a small number of bidders that interact periodically (characteristics 
that facilitate cooperative behavior), the experimental design is intended to study relative 
performance in a setting where both cooperation and competition are plausible outcomes. 
Our experimental design compares the performance of three distinct auctions:   
uniform-price; discriminatory (both multi-unit auctions in which the quantity offered at 
auction is fixed and completely price inelastic, labeled uniform-fixed and discriminatory 
in the sequel); and uniform-price with endogenous supply (in which the seller may reduce 
the quantity sold after observing demand, labeled uniform-reducible).  We use a common 
values setting in which bidders understand that they are playing a repeated game and 
participate in at least fourteen auctions in a session.  Five bidders participate in each 
session (a large body of experimental evidence indicates four agents are sufficient in 
many situations to imply a competitive outcome).  Subjects are allowed to engage in 
nonbinding communication both before and during the conduct of the auctions; however, 
absolute privacy is maintained with respect to their actions.  We thus study relative 
  3mechanism performance in a setting for which the competitive outcome is expected but 
barriers to cooperative behavior are low.
4 
Our major results are as follows.  Bidding strategies under all three auction 
mechanisms are generally inconsistent with the equilibrium strategies identified by 
theory.  This is true for both individual demand curves and aggregate demand curves.  As 
predicted by theory, the uniform-reducible auctions lead on average to higher revenue 
than the uniform-fixed auctions, although the difference is not statistically significant.  
We also find the discriminatory auction to be the most susceptible to collusion.  Contrary 
to the theoretical prediction, this results in lower revenue than the uniform-price auction. 
In many markets the seller is concerned not only with the auction’s revenue but 
also with the effect of the auction on secondary market trading.  Treasuries recognize that 
broader participation and more symmetric allocations in the primary market can promote 
a higher quality secondary market.
5  Despite the lack of a priori differences across 
bidders, we find allocations are most symmetric in the discriminatory auction followed 
by the uniform-fixed auction, with the uniform-reducible auction having the least 
symmetric allocations. 
Most of the experimental economics literature investigating auctions has focused 
on single-unit auctions.  An extensive review of this literature is provided in Kagel 
(1995).  A relatively small number of experimental papers have addressed auction design 
where multiple units are for sale.  Smith (1967) compares uniform-price and 
discriminatory auctions in a common value setting arbitrarily restricting the maximum 
                                                           
4 See Fehr and Fischbacker (2003) for a review of the experimental literature reporting cooperative 
behavior when equilibrium behavior is competitive. 
5 See, for example, Malvey, Archibald, and Flynn (1995), Malvey and Archibald (1998), and Jegadeesh 
(1993). 
  4quantity each bidder may bid for to two units.  He finds that the variance of bids is 
greater under the uniform-price auction, but does not find significant differences with 
respect to revenue.  Miller and Plott (1985) compare uniform-price and discriminatory 
auctions in a private-value setting where the maximum demand is restricted to two units 
and also find inconclusive evidence concerning revenue.  Cox, Smith, and Walker (1985) 
compare multi-unit discriminatory and uniform-price auctions with unit demand.  Despite 
the presence of ten bidders in each session and no communication, they find evidence of 
tacit collusion in sessions with experienced subjects. 
Our paper is most closely related to Goswami, Noe, and Rebello (1996) (GNR). 
GNR investigate the role of communication in the adoption of equilibrium strategies in 
uniform-price and discriminatory auctions.  Using eleven bidders per session with fixed 
supply under both formats, they find that with nonbinding communication, revenue is 
higher in the discriminatory auctions and that the uniform-price auctions are subject to 
collusion.  However, the small number of experimental sessions used by GNR precludes 
strong conclusions being drawn from their investigation. 
This study is distinct from GNR’s examination in that we find a reverse ordering 
for revenue in the uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, and provide an 
experimental examination of the implications of endogenous supply.  In addition, we use 
an experimental design more conducive to coordination than the GNR setting.  Finally, 
we use both students and finance industry professionals as subjects in order to examine 
the potentially important role of subject sophistication in market outcomes. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the theoretical 
foundations of our experiment.  In section 3 we discuss the experimental design, and 
  5present our results in section 4.  Section 5 contains concluding remarks.  The appendix 
contains the instructions to the participants. 
 
2.  Theory 
  In multi-unit auctions bidders may submit multiple price quantity pairs (demand 
schedules) as bids.  Bids are aggregated and the highest price at which aggregate demand 
equals supply is termed the stop-out price.  Winning bids are those submitted at or above 
the stop-out price.  In uniform-price auctions the stop-out price is paid for all winning 
bids while in discriminatory auctions the price paid for winning bids is the bid price. 
The strategic advantage enjoyed by the bidders in a uniform-price auction may be 
explained as follows.  In a uniform-price auction bidders are able to submit “steep” 
(inelastic) demand schedules that result in their sharing the total quantity at a price far 
below the value of the good.  Such an outcome can exist as an equilibrium outcome if the 
bid schedules are “steep enough.”  The pricing rule in a uniform-price auction implies 
that any deviations from the equilibrium bids that allow a bidder to capture an amount 
greater than his/her equilibrium allocation are unprofitable.  Capturing additional quantity 
(which is desirable because price is below value) requires bidder i to “out bid” other 
bidders for their equilibrium allocations.  The steepness of the bid functions implies that 
the price paid for all units rises significantly for each additional unit captured in such a 
deviation.  In essence, the steep demands submitted by the other bidders make marginal 
cost higher than price for additional units and so act to inhibit price competition among 
the bidders in equilibrium.  Further, given the uniform-price format, the high 
inframarginal bids that support the equilibrium are costless to the bidders.  In 
  6equilibrium, the steeper are the individual demand curves, the lower is the stop-out price 
that may be sustained (see Theorem 1 in Back and Zender (1993)). 
In a discriminatory auction, bids submitted above the equilibrium stop-out price 
are not “costless” as they are in the uniform-price format.  All winning bids are filled at 
the bid price.  As compared to the uniform-price auction, bidders in a discriminatory 
auction therefore tend to submit “flatter” bid functions.  This induces more price 
competition among bidders in a discriminatory auction.  In other words, the 
discriminatory pricing rule implies that, regardless of the “shape” of the bid schedules 
submitted by the other bidders, the marginal cost of an additional unit always equals 
price.  Therefore, in a “frictionless” auction game the competitive outcome obtains in any 
equilibrium (see Theorem 3 in Back and Zender (1993)). 
While the use of discriminatory pricing eliminates the strategic advantage given 
to bidders in a uniform-price auction, it suffers more from the “winner’s curse”
6 if the 
environment includes private information and affiliated valuations.  It is therefore 
important to evaluate the extent to which the potential pitfalls of the standard uniform-
price framework may be “cured.”  A common feature of treasury auctions is that the 
seller retains the right to change the quantity sold after observing the bids.  Back and 
Zender (2001) evaluate this feature of uniform-price auctions and show that it eliminates 
“most” of the equilibrium outcomes for which the equilibrium stop-out price is below the 
value of the good.  A seller, acting to maximize revenue, will find it optimal to restrict 
supply when the aggregate demand curve is “steep enough” that the reduction in quantity 
                                                           
6 Because, in an auction, allocations are made to the highest bids, bidders lower or shade their bids relative 
to their estimates of value so that winning is not a signal their estimate was too optimistic.  This response to 
what is called the “winner’s curse” lowers the seller’s expected revenue.  Bid shading in response to the 
winner’s curse is stronger the more directly a bidder’s own bids affect the price paid for units won. 
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rendered strictly worse off by any ex post quantity reduction, so this feature of the auction 
places a limit on how steep the individual bid functions may be in any equilibrium.  
Because steeper demands are associated with lower sustainable stop-out prices, limiting 
the slope of the equilibrium bid functions effectively restricts the extent to which bidders 
may exercise their strategic advantage (see Theorem 2 in Back and Zender (2001)).   
The experiment in this paper examines the mechanism design results discussed 
above.  We use an auction game in which N = 5 bidders compete for Q
* = 26 units of a 
good labeled a widget.  In order to abstract from concerns over the winner’s curse and 
concentrate on the strategic aspects of the a u c t i o n ,  w e  e n s u r e  t h a t  i t  i s  c o m m o n  
knowledge among the bidders that the after-market value of the widget is 20.  Each 
bidder submits quantity orders at 4 distinct prices as bids in each auction.  Each quantity 
order must be for a weakly positive integer number of units (the aggregate quantity 
demanded by a bidder is restricted to be less than or equal to Q
*) and the allowable prices 
are {17, 18, 19, 20}.  A quantity order is an offer to purchase the specified number of 
units at a price equal to or below the price at which that order is submitted. 
Beginning with quantities submitted at a price of 20, the seller aggregates all bid 
schedules to create a downward sloping aggregate demand curve.  In the auctions with 
fixed supply the stop-out price is established as the highest price at which supply equals 
or exceeds the fixed supply.  Winning bids are those submitted at or above the stop-out 
price.  All quantities demanded at prices strictly above the stop-out price are filled.  For 
orders submitted at the resulting stop-out price bidders may be rationed.   
  8Rationing is done in a pro-rata fashion.  Specifically, the aggregate quantity 
demanded at the stop-out price is computed.  The quantity demanded at the stop-out price 
by a given bidder is divided by the aggregate quantity demanded at the stop-out price to 
determine the proportion of the rationed quantity that bidder is to receive.  The rationed 
quantity is determined by subtracting the aggregate quantity demanded at all prices 
strictly above the stop-out price from the final supply.  The case of a uniform-price 
auction with reducible supply will be described more completely below. 
The Uniform-Price Auction with Fixed Supply 
 
Because there is no a priori reason to assume any one bidder is different from any 
other, we concentrate our discussion on the symmetric equilibria of the auction games we 
examine (asymmetric equilibria are discussed below).  For the case of the uniform-price 
auction with fixed supply, a simple application of the analysis in Back and Zender (1993) 
indicates that there exist 4 possible equilibrium stop-out prices; each of the allowable bid 
prices can be supported as the equilibrium stop-out price by an appropriate set of 
equilibrium bid functions.  The analysis of the equilibria in the discrete framework is an 
application of proofs in Back and Zender (1993) and closely follows GNR (1996).   
The bidders can reach a competitive outcome in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of 
the uniform-price auction if all bidders submit bids for at least 7 units at a price of 20.  As 
discussed above, to support equilibria with stop-out prices less than the competitive level 
the equilibrium bid functions must be increasingly steep as the target stop-out price is 
reduced.  The result can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 1:  There exist symmetric Nash equilibria of the uniform-price auction with 
fixed supply that result in stop-out prices at any of the four possible price levels.  (i) If all 
bidders submit demands for 3, 4, or 5 units at a price of 20, demand no units at 18, 21 
units at a price of 17, and demand the balance of the 26 total units at 19, the equilibrium 
stop-out price will be 17.  (ii) A stop-out price of 18 can be supported if all bidders 
  9submit demand curves with a total demand of 5 units at prices of 20 and 19, with at least 
4 units demanded at 20, and 21 units demanded at 18.  (iii) A stop-out price of 19 can be 
obtained in equilibrium if all bidders submit demands for 5 units at a price of 20 and 
demand for 21 units at 19.  (iv) The competitive outcome is an equilibrium if all bidders 
submit demands for 26 units at a price of 20.  In all of the symmetric equilibria each 
bidder will receive 5 and 1/5
th units. 
 
  A difficulty in working with the uniform-price auction is the multiplicity of Nash 
equilibria.  Only the Pareto dominant equilibria, those with stop-out prices of 17, are 
coalition proof (see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987) and the discussion in 
Goswami, Noe, and Rebello (1996)).  Furthermore, each bidder obtains an added payoff 
of Fr. 5.2 in these equilibria relative to the equilibria in which the stop-out price is 18.  
We will, therefore, focus on these equilibria in our analysis. 
Discriminatory Auctions 
 
  Theorem 3 in Back and Zender (1993) indicates that in a discriminatory auction, 
when the value of the good is common knowledge, the good is perfectly divisible, and the 
price grid is continuous, the competitive outcome is obtained for the seller in any Nash 
equilibrium.  The common knowledge aspect is important in eliminating issues related to 
the winner’s curse, and continuity is necessary so that price competition can be as 
effective as possible.  In the auction presented here there are actually two equilibria.  The 
first is the competitive equilibrium in which all bidders submit bids of 26 units at a price 
of 20.  This results in the bidders receiving none of the surplus from the auction and is an 
equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies since it is not possible for a positive payoff to 
result from bids at a price of 20.  The second equilibrium has all bidders bidding for 26 
units of the good at a price of 19.  While this is not the competitive outcome, this is an 
equilibrium of the discriminatory auction because the value of the good is known to be 
equal to the next available bid price.  A bidder who bids for any positive quantity at a 
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price of 20 will always receive a zero payoff on those units.  Essentially, discreteness in 
the allowable price levels acts as a friction that limits the extent of price competition. 
Proposition 2:  The only Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies in a discriminatory 
auction has all bidders submitting demands for 26 units at a price of 19. 
 
  If any bidder plays this equilibrium strategy then the others will find the same 
strategy optimal.  Bidding for a positive quantity at a price other than 19 will have a zero 
payoff if each bidder expects at least one other bidder to play the equilibrium strategy.  
Relative to the uniform price auction with fixed supply the equilibrium demands in the 
discriminatory auction tend to be “flatter” and contain less of a discount implying higher 
expected revenue for the seller. 
Uniform-Price Auction with Reducible Supply 
 
With reducible supply, the seller announces a target supply of Q
* at the beginning 
of the auction but retains the right to reduce the actual quantity supplied after observing 
the submitted bids.  The seller is assumed to choose the actual supply to maximize profit.  
For purposes of illustration, suppose the seller faces a cost for deviating from the 
announced supply and model this cost as C(Q) = k(Q
* - Q), for some positive parameter 
k.  After observing the submitted bid functions the seller aggregates the bids and then 
chooses Q ≤ Q
* to maximize his net profit. 
When the seller retains the right to reduce supply, the set of equilibrium outcomes 
is reduced as compared to the set of equilibria in the uniform-price auction with fixed 
supply.  Because the seller is able to reduce the supply, bidders have an incentive to 
submit as “flat” a bid function as possible to support a given stop-out price as an 
equilibrium.  The extent to which the set of equilibria is reduced depends upon the 
parameter, k, in the seller’s cost function.  For this discussion we examine two values for the cost parameter: 0 and 8.  With a cost parameter of zero, the only equilibrium of a 
uniform-price auction with reducible supply is the competitive equilibrium.  The 
willingness of the seller to deviate from the announced supply induces the bidders to 
submit bid functions so flat that only a stop-out price of 20 can be sustained in 
equilibrium.  With a cost parameter of 8 the seller is reluctant to reduce supply ex post; 
consequently, only a stop-out price of 17 cannot be supported in equilibrium. 
Proposition 3:  In a uniform-price auction with reducible supply: (i) If the seller faces no 
cost of deviating from the target quantity Q
* the only equilibrium is the competitive 
outcome.  (ii) If the seller has a cost parameter k = 8 for deviations from the target 
quantity then the prices 18, 19, and 20 can be sustained in an equilibrium.  In order to 
sustain 18 as an equilibrium stop-out price bidders must submit demands for 4 units at a 
price of 20, 1 unit at 19 and 21 units at 18 (i.e., submit the “flattest” of the equilibrium 
bid functions presented in Proposition 1). 
 
In our experiments we use a cost parameter of 0 in order to provide the maximum impact 
for the seller’s right to choose supply ex post and the existence of a unique equilibrium.  
As in the case of the discriminatory auction, relative to the uniform-price auction with 
fixed supply, the increased price competition motivated by reducible supply implies the 
equilibrium bid schedules are more elastic and contain less of a discount. 
  A notable aspect of these strategies is that the bids for the first 6 units enforce the 
equilibrium stop-out price.  For example, consider the equilibrium in the uniform-price 
auction with fixed supply in which bidders submit demands for 5 units at a price of 20 
and 21 units at a price of 18.  These demands result in a stop-out price of 18 and a 
symmetric allocation of the good.  The bid for 5 units at a price of 20 allows the 
equilibrium stop-out price to be lower than value and the first unit demanded at 18 
establishes the level of the stop-out price.  The other 20 units demanded at the price of 18 
are simply there to ensure each bidder gets the largest possible share of the “26
th unit.”   
  12The use of the Nash equilibrium concept lies behind the shape of the “tail” of the 
equilibrium strategy.  If bidders believe there is a significant chance others may deviate 
from the equilibrium strategy they may use their bids for the final 20 units differently 
than is described by the equilibrium strategies.  It will therefore be interesting not only to 
compare the actual total demand curves with the equilibrium strategies, but also, to 
compare the demands placed for the first 6 units with the equilibrium strategies. 
  In summary, the testable predictions are: 
1.  Bidders’ demand curves should be flatter and include less of a discount in the 
discriminatory auction as compared to those in the uniform-fixed auction. 
2.  Bidders’ demand curves should be flatter and include less of a discount in the 
uniform-reducible auction as compared to those in the uniform-fixed auction. 
3.  The seller’s average revenue should be highest in the uniform-reducible auction 
followed by the discriminatory auction and lowest for the uniform-fixed auction. 
4.  Allocations of the good in the auctions should be symmetric without significant 
differences across the different mechanisms. 
5.  The multiplicity of equilibria in the uniform-fixed mechanism allows for more 
variation in revenue across auctions than do the other mechanisms. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Auction Rules 
In each auction, subjects submitted bid schedules at computer terminals for units of a 
good that we called widgets.  All monetary values were denominated in an experimental 
currency referred to as Francs (Fr.).  The resale value of each widget was Fr. 20 for all 
  13subjects, and this was common knowledge at the start of bidding.  A bidder’s payoff in an 
auction was calculated as the sum, over all units allocated to that bidder, of the differences 
between the resale value of each unit allocated and the price paid for that unit.  The details of 
pricing, allocations, and quantities supplied in the different auctions are as described above. 
3.2 Experimental Methodology 
Each experimental session consisted of 5 subjects and each cohort of 5 subjects 
was involved in a single experimental treatment.  We employed both students and finance 
industry professionals as subjects.  The students were senior undergraduate, MBA, and 
MIS students.  All had had at least one course in finance, and courses in statistics and 
economics.  There were two types of professional subjects.  The first group consisted of 
employees of the monetary department of the Bank of Israel, which is responsible for the 
design and routine conduct of the notes auctions and for the routine conduct of the bond 
auctions for the Israeli Treasury.  The second consisted of three cohorts of mutual fund 
and pension fund managers at a leading investment bank in Israel.  All members of this 
second group had had experience with financial asset auctions.   
Table 1 lists the information pertaining to each experimental session.  Five 
repetitions of the uniform-fixed and the discriminatory treatments and four repetitions of 
the uniform-reducible were conducted with students.  Two repetitions of each treatment 
were conducted with professionals.  There were at least 14 auctions conducted in each 
experimental session with the exact number chosen randomly.  In order to control for 
experience effects, we analyze only the first 14 auctions in each experimental session. 
At the start of each experimental session, subjects were seated in a conference room 
and given written instructions.  The instructions explained the auction rules, the basis on 
  14which cash payments would be made, and included images that introduced the subjects to the 
software used to conduct the experiment.  The instructions were read aloud, and subjects 
were then given the opportunity to ask clarifying questions.  The student subjects were then 
given a quiz to ensure their understanding of the bidding and allocation rules.  (A copy of the 
written instructions, sample computer screens, and the quiz are included in the appendix.) 
Subjects were allowed to discuss strategies and outcomes with each other before, 
during, and after each auction.  The layout of the computer lab, however, prevented each 
subject from seeing the screen of any other subject, and subjects were informed that this 
would be counter to the auction rules.  Therefore, while communication was open, actual 
bidding behavior remained private knowledge.  After the final auction in each session 
each subject’s screen automatically reverted to a blank screen (to maintain the privacy of 
bidding behavior as subjects left the lab) and student subjects were paid individually in a 
side room.  The exchange rate between Fr and $US (the currency in which subjects were 
paid) was $US = 10 Fr. Payments to student subjects averaged $20.  (Regulations 
precluded cash payments to most of the professional subjects, so we rewarded them with 
prizes bearing the logos of the researchers’ sponsoring universities.) 
The auctions were conducted with custom designed software.  In addition to 
allowing the entry of bids, the software graphed individual demand curves in real time as 
each subject initiated the bid submission process.  The aggregate demand schedule, stop-
out price, and allocations for each round were calculated by the software at the 
completion of each auction.  After each round each bidder was provided with information 
on the number of total units demanded at each price.  In addition, the interface provided 
historical information pertaining to each subject’s previously submitted demand functions 
  15matched with their allocations, profit, and percentage of available supply received for 
each completed auction.  Each experimental session lasted approximately 45 minutes.     
 
4. Experimental Results 
We assess the experimental outcomes along the following dimensions: bidding 
strategies, clearing prices, seller’s revenue, and the symmetry of the allocations. 
4.1 Bidding Basics 
Prior to comparing the actual bids to the equilibrium strategies, there are some 
basic aspects of bidding in the auction games, identified by the propositions above, that 
are interesting to examine.  Proposition 2 notes that bidding in the discriminatory auction 
for any quantity at a price of 20 is a weakly dominated strategy in a one-shot game.  
Given the simplicity of establishing that a bid at 20 is a dominated bid we expected to see 
little or no bidding in the 98 discriminatory auctions at the price of 20.  Examination of 
the data shows that only in 3 of the 98 discriminatory auctions did any bidder submit 
orders at a price of 20.  It is also true that the bids all came from the same bidder and do 
not appear to be part of a punishment/retaliation strategy.  Thus only 1 of the 35 bidders 
that participated in the discriminatory auctions submitted a bid that was weakly 
dominated in this way.  None of the 10 professionals who participated in discriminatory 
auctions submitted bids at a price of 20. 
The theoretical results also identify bidding for fewer than 26 units in any auction 
as a weakly dominated strategy.  Examination of the data shows that this occurred in only 
29 of the 280 (10.5%) auctions.  Interestingly, this strategy occurred more often in the 
uniform-reducible auctions (where in 15.5% of the auctions bidders submitted demands 
  16for fewer than 26 units) than in the uniform-fixed and the discriminatory auctions (8.2% 
of these auctions).
7  The exact reason for this difference is unclear but may be related to 
expectations of a supply reduction.  The occurrence of this strategy tended to be isolated 
in the sense that in only one of the 29 auctions with aggregate demand less than 130 units 
did more than one bidder bid for less than 26 units.  21% of bidders played this weakly 
dominated strategy in 12 of the 20 sessions.  40% of the professionals played strategies 
that were weakly dominated in this way while less than 13% of the students did.
8 
A final notable aspect of the bidding is the extent of collusion that occurred in the 
auctions across the different mechanisms.  Collusion in the auctions could take on many 
forms and so it is difficult to completely examine this issue.  However, one collusive 
scheme which we label “perfect collusion” is easily identifiable.  If all 5 bidders submit 
demands for 26 units at a price of 17 in any auction we call this a perfectly collusive 
outcome.  Regardless of the pricing rule, perfect collusion results in all units being 
allocated evenly across the 5 bidders at the lowest possible price.  It is clearly collusive in 
the sense that for any bidder, if all other bidders are expected to play these strategies, 
there exist easily identifiable strategies that will capture a much greater allocation with 
either an increase in price of one Franc (necessary in the discriminatory auctions) or no 
increase in price (possible in uniform-price auctions). 
Relative to the competitive outcome (equilibrium in the uniform-reducible 
auctions) there are strong incentives for subjects to collude.  The competitive outcome 
results in zero profits for all bidders.  The profit per bidder from perfectly collusive play 
                                                           
7 Using each auction as an independent observation this difference is not significant at conventional levels 
(p=0.16) using the Fisher exact test. 
 
8 This difference is significant (p<0.01) treating each subject as an independent observation. 
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is Fr. 218.40 (or $21.84).  However, as just noted, the added payoff for unilateral 
deviation from the perfectly collusive strategy is Fr. 36.4 in a single discriminatory 
auction or Fr. 59.43 in a single uniform-price auction. 
Consistent with the arguments developed in Friedman (1960), the discriminatory 
auctions were more susceptible to perfect collusion than were the uniform-price auctions.  
Of the 7 sessions of discriminatory auctions, 3 sessions saw the perfectly collusive 
outcome in all 14 auctions (labeled perfectly collusive sessions in the sequel).  Of the 13 
sessions using a uniform-price format only 4 were perfectly collusive sessions.  Using the 
Fischer exact test (p<=0.01) or the t-test (p<0.01) the discriminatory auctions are 
significantly more collusive than the auctions using the uniform-price format when each 
auction is treated as an independent observation.  A lack of independence across auctions 
within a session is likely to mean these significance levels are overstated.  The most 
conservative control for this problem of “cohort effects,
9” using each session as an 
observation (the number of observations is 6 or 7), implies the difference is insignificant. 
Two of the discriminatory sessions resulted in the perfectly collusive outcome in 
the final 4 auctions of the session.  The remaining 2 discriminatory sessions are the only 
discriminatory sessions that did not result in perfectly collusive outcomes for a significant 
proportion of the auctions.  These remaining discriminatory sessions converged to the 
equilibrium outcome.  Of the sessions using the uniform-price format that were not 
perfectly collusive, only one saw the perfectly collusive outcome in the final auctions.  
This session, however, also saw perfectly collusive strategies used in the first two 
                                                           
9 Cohort effects arise when results from an experimental session (a set of interactions with a single group of 
subjects) are affected by characteristics of the subjects themselves independently of the mechanism. 
  18auctions.  Defining convergence to the perfectly collusive outcome as sessions that do not 
start at the collusive outcome but realize that outcome in the final auctions
10 there are 
significant differences between the discriminatory and the uniform-price auctions.  For 
the discriminatory auction 2 of 4 sessions converged to the perfectly collusive outcome 
while in the uniform-price format, of the 8 sessions that did not begin with a perfectly 
collusive outcome, none converged to the collusive outcome.
11  Finally, note that only the 
discriminatory format saw a perfectly collusive session with the professional subjects. 
Interestingly, one session of the uniform-reducible auction resulted in the 
perfectly collusive outcome in the first auction.  In the second auction of this session, 
however, one bidder defected, and submitted a demand for all 26 units at a price of 18 
breaking the coalition.  In the remaining 12 auctions for this session the resulting stop-out 
price was either 19 or 20 (6 at each price) indicating an aggressive response to defection. 
4.2 Bidding Strategies 
The complexity of the strategy space available to bidders in multi-unit auctions 
makes the comparison of the actual bid schedules submitted by the participants to the 
theoretical equilibrium demands somewhat difficult.  Keloharju, Nyborg and Rydqvist 
(2002) use a methodology that compares the moments of the distribution of the individual 
bids on a given bid schedule to the moments of the theoretical equilibrium schedules.  We 
adopt their methodology to make comparisons between the actual individual demand 
schedules and each of the possible equilibria for a particular setting.   
                                                           
10 This definition is used because the outcomes of the first rounds of each session are likely to be more 
reflective of characteristics of the cohort than the mechanism.  The change in behavior of cohorts that do 
not begin playing a collusive strategy will be more reflective of the mechanism.  Note also that in all 
sessions that converged to the collusive outcome this outcome was realized for at least the final 4 auctions. 
 
11 This is a statistically significant difference with the Fischer exact test and the t-test providing p-values of 
0.04 and 0.03 respectively. 
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Before examining the actual demands we investigate whether the subjects actually 
submit demand schedules rather than a single price/quantity combination.  Figure 1 
shows that in many auctions (59% in the uniform-fixed auctions, 58% in the uniform-
reducible auctions, and 36% in the discriminatory auctions) at least one bidder submitted 
multiple price/quantity combinations.  This is consistent with the empirical finding in 
HNyborg,  HHBindseil  Hand  HStrebulaev (2002) in their study of repo auctions.  It is, however,H 
very different from the theoretical predictions.  In the coalition proof equilibria of the 
uniform-fixed auction, theory predicts that all subjects will submit multiple price/quantity 
pairs as bids.  Figure 1 also shows that only 9% of uniform-fixed auctions saw all 5 
subjects submit multiple price/quantity pairs as bids.  In both the uniform-reducible and 
discriminatory mechanisms, theory predicts that all subjects will submit a single price-
quantity combination as a bid.  The discriminatory auctions come closest to this 
prediction; 64% of these auctions result in all bidders submitting flat demands. 
The first moment of the demand curves we consider is the discount.  The discount 
is measured as the difference between the secondary market price and the quantity 
weighted average price, , p of a bidder’s demand schedule.  Let qi denote the quantity on a 
given demand curve demanded at a price i, where i  ∈ {17, 18, 19, 20} and let 
∑ = =
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Table 2-A compares the moments of the equilibrium individual demand curve to 
the average individual demand curve submitted in each type of auction.  To examine the 
question of whether “in aggregate rather than individually” the subjects were playing 
equilibrium strategies, Table 2-B compares the moments of the equilibrium aggregate 
demand curves to the average aggregate demand curves submitted in each type of 
auction.  With either method, the results indicate that the actual bidding strategies of the 
subjects differ significantly from the theoretical predictions for all three mechanisms.
12   
Tables 2-A and 2-B, and Figure 2, illustrate that the demands submitted by the 
subjects differed from the equilibrium demands in particular ways.  In the discriminatory 
auctions, bidders on average submit steeper bid schedules and lower bids (bids with a 
greater discount) than predicted by the theory.  The steepness arises because the 
equilibrium demand is completely flat while the actual demands are not.  The greater 
discount arises from collusion.  The same differences occur in the uniform-reducible 
                                                           
12 In the uniform-fixed mechanism there exists a family of asymmetric equilibria in which the aggregate 
demand curve of each asymmetric equilibrium is equivalent to the aggregate demand curve of a symmetric 
equilibrium.  Rejection of the symmetric equilibria for the uniform-fixed auctions based on the aggregate 
demands (Table 2B) also constitutes a rejection of these asymmetric equilibria. 
 auctions.  The measures of the discount and dispersion of the actual demands are both 
significantly greater than the measures suggested by the theory.  However, in the 
uniform-fixed auctions the submitted demands (Figure 2) are flatter and include a smaller 
discount.  Tables 2-A and 2-B show that the measures of discount and dispersion are 
significantly smaller than those implied by the theory.  This indicates that bidders did not 
recognize the strategic advantage provided by the ability to submit demand curves in the 
uniform-price auction, engaging instead in naïvely competitive behavior.
13 
Figure 2 suggests that in many cases the differences from theoretical equilibrium 
may have been driven by the “tail” of the individual demand curves, i.e., that part of the 
individual’s demand curve (for cumulative quantities greater than 6) for which there is 
relatively little chance of an allocation.  To investigate the conjecture that the bidders 
were in fact bidding for the “first 6 units” with equilibrium strategies, we repeated the 
moment calculations using only these first units demanded by each bidder.  Table 2-C 
indicates that on average the aggregation of the individual demands submitted for the 
“first 6 units” are significantly different from the theoretical prediction for this curve.
14 
As compared to the uniform-fixed mechanism, theory predicts that the use of 
discriminatory pricing or reducible supply will “raise” and “flatten” the individual 
demands.  Figure 3 shows that, as predicted, reducible supply results in lower discounts 
and flatter demands than were submitted in the uniform-price auctions with fixed supply.  
However, the differences in the discounts and the standard deviations are not statistically 
                                                           
13 This result is consistent with the findings of GNR.  The result does not change if we restrict attention to 
sessions of the uniform-fixed auction using professional participants. 
 
14 As a further robustness check, we examined the average of the individual demands restricting attention to 
the first 6 units demanded and found similar results.  We also eliminated from the sample the perfectly 
collusive sessions.  The same qualitative results were obtained. 
 
  22significant.  Discriminatory pricing also results in flatter demand curves;
15 however, the 
discounts are greater rather than lower.  The larger discount appears again to be the result 
of the greater incidence of perfect collusion in the discriminatory auctions. 
Given that subjects do not play Nash strategies, an interesting question to ask is: 
Were subjects leaving significant amounts of money on the table by not adopting the 
equilibrium strategies?  We can examine this question to a limited extent by calculating 
the average change in an individual subject’s payoff generated by a switch to the Nash 
strategy, taking the strategies of the other bidders as given.  This calculation makes an 
implicit assumption concerning a bidder’s beliefs about the play of the other bidders.  It is 
also true that in a repeated game environment examining the average payoff change in 
this way will overstate any improvement as it does not take into account the response of 
the other subjects in later auctions.  While we cannot control for the response to a change 
in strategies we can partially control for this problem by eliminating from the analysis the 
7 perfectly collusive sessions and evaluating only the remaining 13 sessions.  As noted 
above, the observed response to a deviation from perfect collusion is aggressive. 
In the uniform-reducible auction the equilibrium strategy is competitive bidding; 
all subjects bid for the entire quantity at a price of Fr. 20.  A change to this strategy will 
in many cases entail a loss in payoff.  The average loss from Nash play per bidder would 
have been Fr. 3.72 ($0.37) in each auction.  In the uniform-fixed auctions the coalition 
proof equilibrium strategies result in a stop-out price of 17 and the payoffs are equivalent 
to those under perfect collusion.  The average increase in payoff a bidder would have 
received from a change to the equilibrium strategy was Fr. 1.73 ($0.17) per auction. 
                                                           
15 The difference between the average standard deviations in the uniform-fixed and the discriminatory 
auctions is statistically significant (p = .045). 
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average, to a bidder from changing to the equilibrium strategy was Fr. 6.05 ($0.61).  The 
reason subjects appear to be leaving relatively large amounts of money on the table in the 
discriminatory auction is due to the fact that while this calculation excludes the perfectly 
collusive sessions, the remaining sessions saw perfectly collusive strategies in a large 
number of their auctions.  Unilateral deviation from the collusive strategy is very 
profitable for an individual bidder in a single auction but may not maximize expected 
total payoff.  For the two discriminatory sessions did not converge to perfect collusion 
(rather converged to the equilibrium outcome), examination of the bidding strategies 
auction by auction shows it was deviation from earlier perfectly collusive outcomes by 
one or two bidders that resulted in competitive play toward the end of these sessions. 
The evidence indicates that bidders’ strategies were “close” to equilibrium in the 
sense that they were not losing much by not using the Nash strategies.  This is clearly true 
in the uniform-price auctions.  In the discriminatory auction the reported increase is likely 
to be more representative of a one time change in profit for a bidder in exchange for a 
large reduction in subsequent auctions. 
4.3 Clearing Prices and Revenue 
In this section we compare clearing prices and revenue across the three 
mechanisms.  Mean clearing prices and revenue by session are reported in Table 1.   
Auction by auction results for each session are reported in Table 3.  Panel A of Figure 5 
examines how revenue changes with experience over the 14 auctions. 
Across all auctions and all sessions, average revenue is highest under the uniform- 
reducible mechanism with average revenue of Fr. 481.1 and an average stop-out price of 
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with average revenue of Fr. 477.6 and an average stop-out price of Fr. 18.4.  The lowest 
revenue obtains under the discriminatory pricing rule.  Here revenue averages Fr. 462.4, 
the stop-out price averages Fr. 17.5 and the average price paid is Fr. 17.8 (recall that in 
the discriminatory auctions winning bidders pay their bids so the stop-out price is the 
lower bound for the average price paid).  With the exception of a single auction under the 
uniform-reducible mechanism, all 26 units were sold in every auction.  The revenue 
ranking from the auctions (REVUR>REVUF>REVD) differs from the third major 
theoretical prediction listed in Section 2 (REVUR>REVD>REVUF). 
Panel A of Figure 5 shows noticeable patterns in revenue as the subjects gain 
experience in a session.  For each time series, the first point represents the average for all 
auctions under each mechanism, the second point is the average for auctions 2 through 
14, and the third is the average for auctions 3 through 14, and so on.  Under the 
discriminatory mechanism, revenue declines monotonically as later periods are compared 
with the global average.  Three sessions maintain the perfectly collusive outcome for all 
14 auctions and two additional sessions converge to this outcome.  The remaining two 
sessions converge to the unique Nash equilibrium (a stop-out price of $19 with 
symmetric allocations).  Under the uniform-fixed mechanism, revenue is lower in the 
second half of the sessions.  However, none of the sessions that start away from the 
collusive outcome converge to it with experience.  Under the uniform-reducible pricing 
rule, revenue is almost constant with experience.  Again, no session that starts away from 
the collusive outcome converges to it.  Importantly, the revenue ranking based on global 
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experience with the mechanism and in interacting with other cohort members. 
In order to assess the statistical significance of revenue differences across the 
three mechanisms, we face the challenge of simultaneously controlling for experience 
effects (which Figure 5 suggests are mechanism specific) and cohort effects.  Since panel 
data methods that simultaneously control for both are extremely unreliable in small 
samples,
16 we first perform analysis that controls for experience effects, and then perform 
analysis on the level of the session in order to control for cohort effects. 
In order to test for revenue differences while controlling for experience effects, 
we first averaged the clearing price of all seven (six in the reducible mechanism) sessions 
for each of the three mechanisms according to their sequence (1-14) to get an average 
sequence of revenue for each mechanism.  We then compare the first auction’s revenue 
under each mechanism, the second auction’s revenue, and so on.  (Although this 
procedure perfectly controls for experience effects, it does not control for the potential 
lack of independence between auctions within a session and therefore biases downward 
standard errors.)  We employ both the non-parametric approximate randomization test 
and a standard matched-pairs t-test, with all test statistics reported for two-tailed tests. 
The average revenue sequence under the uniform-reducible pricing rule is higher 
than under the uniform-fixed mechanism, with the difference significant at the 10% level 
for both the randomization test and the t-test (p=0.10 and p=0.10 respectively).  Average 
revenue under the discriminatory mechanism is significantly lower than either uniform-
price mechanism (p<0.01) for both tests.   
                                                           
16 See, for example, Beck and Katz (1995). 
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subjects.  Significantly, when we disaggregate the data by subject type, revenue is lowest 
under the discriminatory mechanism for both types. 
The most conservative data analysis strategy controls for cohort effects by 
treating the mean revenue from each session as a single data point.  However, this 
approach does not control for differential rates of change in revenue across mechanisms 
as subjects become experienced.  In order to control for within-session experience effects, 
we analyze the last 4 auctions from each session, since these are the auctions most likely 
to represent equilibrium outcomes (Figure 5 supports the choice of the last 4 auctions as 
the cutoff point).  We calculate the average revenue over the last 4 auctions of each 
session and use each average as a data point in the following (OLS) regression: 
REVENUE = b1 + b2UF + b3UR + b4PROF + e . 
 
UF is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 in uniform-fixed sessions and 0 
otherwise. UR is an equivalent indicator variable for uniform-reducible supply sessions.  
PROF is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 for sessions with professionals 
as subjects, and 0 otherwise.  The indicator for the discriminatory mechanism is 
suppressed; the mean for the discriminatory sessions is captured by the intercept after 
controlling for PROF, and the estimated coefficients for UF and UR represent differences 
between these session means and the mean for the discriminatory sessions.  We estimate 
the model with all 20 sessions and with the 12 sessions where fewer than 50% of the 
auctions result in the perfectly collusive outcome.  This is a robustness test since group 
dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion - independent 
of the role of the mechanism.  Results are reported in Table 4. 
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mechanisms and between the uniform-fixed and discriminatory-price mechanism are not 
significant under either data grouping.  Revenue under the uniform- reducible mechanism 
exceeds that under the discriminatory mechanism for both data groupings with the 
differences significant at the 10% level in two-tailed tests. The coefficient on the 
indicator for professionals is positive and significant at the 1% and 10% level, 
respectively, for the two data groupings, indicating higher revenue in these sessions.   
Importantly, for both subject types, the revenue in the discriminatory auctions is lower 
than the average revenue from the two uniform-price auctions over the last four auctions. 
The weight of the evidence suggests a significant revenue difference between the 
discriminatory and uniform-reducible mechanisms, weak evidence of a difference 
between the discriminatory and uniform-fixed mechanisms, and little evidence for a 
difference between the uniform-price mechanisms.  While the global average revenue 
comparisons and Figure 3 indicate that the use of reducible supply generates price 
competition between the bidders relative to the uniform-fixed auction this result is not 
significant.  The finding that discriminatory pricing results in the lowest average revenue 
is significant and contrary to our expectation.   
This revenue difference between the discriminatory and uniform-price 
mechanisms is not caused by a larger number of cohorts facing discriminatory auctions 
having experience with the collusive level of revenue (442 Francs):  a comparable 
number of sessions using uniform-pricing experience this level of revenue at least once (5 
of 7 under uniform-fixed, 4 of 6 under uniform-reducible, and 5 of 7 under 
discriminatory).  Rather, the difference is caused by the greater propensity for revenue to 
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session equally, once this level of revenue has been achieved it is repeated in 86.7% of 
subsequent auctions.  In the uniform-fixed and uniform-reducible mechanisms, these 
percentages are 62.1% and 53.8%, respectively.  Excluding the perfectly collusive 
sessions, the difference is even greater with 66.7% of subsequent auctions achieving the 
collusive level of revenue under the discriminatory rule, and only 33.3% and 7.7% under 
the uniform-fixed and uniform-reducible mechanisms, respectively.
17 
4.4 Allocations 
Along with revenue maximization, Treasuries seek to establish a liquid secondary 
market for their securities.  For this reason, broad bidder participation in their auctions 
and low concentration of auction awards are major objectives in auction design.
18 
We begin our examination of award concentration across the different 
mechanisms with Figure 4.  This figure illustrates that the most frequent allocation of 
units across bidders is the perfectly symmetric allocation of 5.2 units per bidder.  There 
are, however, significant differences in the level of asymmetry of allocations across the 
mechanisms.  While in the discriminatory auctions 69% of the allocations were for 
between 5 and 6 units, for both uniform-price mechanisms only 41% of allocations were 
for between 5 and 6 units. 
                                                           
17 Testing the Discriminatory auctions against a combination of the two versions of the Uniform-price 
auctions and using each auction as an observation both of these differences (whether or not the perfectly 
collusive sessions are excluded) are significant at better than the 1% level. 
 
18 Malvey, Archibald, and Flynn (1995) report that broadening participation and reducing award 
concentration were primary objectives in the U.S. experiment with uniform-price auctions held between 
1992 and 1994.  In addition, the U.S. Treasury prohibits individual dealers from buying more than 35% of 
any auction.  The effect of award concentration on the secondary market has been studied in the context of 
the 1991 Salomon Brothers squeeze (Jegadeesh (1993)). 
 
 
  29We examine the symmetry of allocations across the subjects using the Herfindahl 
– Hirschman (HH) index, which sums the squares of the percentage allocations to the 
bidders.  If allocations are perfectly symmetric, the value of the index is 2000, while if a 
single bidder receives the entire allocation, its value is 10,000.  The symmetric allocation 
is expected on average as there is no ex ante reason to consider the bidders as 
asymmetric.  Table 5 reports that overall the discriminatory auctions result in the lowest 
average concentration, while the uniform-reducible auctions result in the highest. 
Panel B of Figure 5 indicates that the most striking impact of experience on the 
HH index is in the discriminatory auctions where by auction 11, allocations are perfectly 
symmetric in 6 of the 7 sessions, and nearly so in the seventh.  Asymmetry also decreases 
significantly in the uniform-reducible auctions, although over the last 4 auctions the HH 
index remains significantly higher (59%) than under the discriminatory sessions.  There 
are no experience-induced patterns in symmetry of allocations under the uniform-fixed 
mechanism.  Experience changes the asymmetry ranking of the three mechanisms relative 
to the global averages: the discriminatory pricing rule results in the most symmetric 
allocations at any level of experience, however the uniform-reducible mechanism 
converges to more symmetric allocations than the uniform-fixed mechanism. 
We use the same data analysis strategy as in Section 4.3; i.e., we first perfectly 
control for experience effects and then test for differences using session level data.  We 
initially averaged the HH index of all seven (six in the reducible mechanism) sessions for 
each of the three mechanisms according to their sequence (1-14) to get an average 
sequence of the index for each mechanism.  We then compare the first period’s index 
level under each mechanism, and then the second period’s, and so on. 
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randomization test and t-test reported respectively: HHUF>HHUR so allocations are more 
asymmetric in the uniform-fixed auctions than the uniform-reducible auctions, but the 
difference is only marginally significant (p=0.13 and p=0.12); HHUF>HHD (p=0.10 and 
p=0.10); and HHUR>HHD (p<0.01 and p<0.01).  
We next analyze the data controlling for experience effects.  Given the differential 
rates of change in experimental outcomes across mechanisms as subjects become 
experienced (Figure 5, Panel B), we again control for within-session experience effects 
by analyzing the last four auctions from each session.  We calculate the average HH 
index level over the last four auctions of each session and then use each session mean as 
a single data point in the following (OLS) regression: 
HH-INDEX = b1 + b2UF + b3UR + b4PROF + e . 
 
Variable definitions are the same as in Section 4.3.  We again estimate the model with all 
20 sessions and as a robustness test, with the 12 sessions where fewer than 50% of the 
auctions result in the perfectly collusive outcome.  Results are reported in Table 6. 
Differences in allocation asymmetry between the uniform-fixed and uniform-
reducible mechanisms are not significant for either sample.  The discriminatory auction 
resulted in significantly more symmetric allocations than either uniform-price 
mechanism.  Allocation asymmetry under the uniform-fixed mechanism was greater than 
under the discriminatory mechanism for both samples, with the difference significant at 
the 5% level and 1% levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.  The uniform-reducible 
mechanism also had more asymmetric allocations than the discriminatory-price 
mechanism in both samples with the differences being significant at the 10% level and 
1% levels, respectively.  The coefficient on the indicator for professionals is insignificant. 
  31The strongest and most important revenue and allocation results are the 
significantly greater symmetry of allocation and significantly lower revenue under the 
discriminatory mechanism.  Unfortunately, this may suggest that higher revenue and 
more symmetric allocations are competing goals.  Symmetric allocations seem to play an 
important role in achieving the collusive level of revenue across all three mechanisms: in 
94% of the auctions where the collusive revenue outcome obtains the allocations are 
perfectly symmetric and this combination of revenue and allocation is more likely to 
occur under the discriminatory mechanism.  Furthermore, under both uniform-price 
mechanisms, when the allocation is perfectly symmetric, the perfectly collusive outcome 
is always realized.  The perfectly collusive outcome occurs in 89% of the discriminatory 
auctions for which the allocation is perfectly symmetric (the exceptions are when the 
unique equilibrium outcome obtains). 
Auction-level results indicate that this relationship between perfectly symmetric 
allocations and the collusive level of revenue leads to a strong positive correlation 
between revenue and the HH index under all three mechanisms.  When we divide the 
sample according to the different mechanisms, the highest correlation is found for the 
uniform-reducible auctions (0.53), followed by the uniform-fixed (0.40), and the 
discriminatory auctions (0.32).  All the correlations are significant at the 1% level. 
Since avoiding the collusive outcome with respect to revenue is of primary 
importance in auction design, we also consider the relationship between revenue and 
asymmetry when revenue exceeds the collusive level.  We accomplish this by excluding 
from the analysis the sessions in which the perfectly collusive outcome was attained in all 
auctions.  This weakens the relationship significantly, with the obtained correlation 
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p=0.41, and p=0.53 for UF, UR, and D, respectively).  Under all three mechanisms, the 
relationship becomes noisier in part because although the defection of a single bidder 
from a collusive agreement tends to both increase revenue and produce asymmetric 
allocations, there are many auctions in which several bidders simultaneously bid 
aggressively.  The discriminatory auctions, in which the unique Nash equilibrium obtains, 
result in both high revenue and symmetric allocations.  Thus, when perfect collusion is 
avoided, the relationship between revenue and symmetry is very weak. 
4.5 Variation in Revenue 
A further concern for a seller in a repeated setting is variation in the revenue 
received across similar auctions.  Indexing mechanism type with j and the specific 
session with i we define the ratio: Total average revenuej / Var(average revenueji).  We 
find the discriminatory auction has the highest ratio, 1.06, followed by the uniform-price 
with reducible supply with 0.49, and finally the uniform-price with fixed supply, 0.46. 
These results are roughly in line with the theory.  Only the uniform-fixed case 
supports multiple equilibria and so is predicted to have the lowest ratio.  And if the 
theoretical results are thought to hold “on average,” then for a given variation in revenue 
for the discriminatory and the uniform-reducible auctions, the uniform-reducible auction 
would be predicted to have a higher ratio due to its higher expected revenue.  If the seller 
has a strong aversion to variation in revenue, this result provides an impetus for the use of 
a discriminatory auction despite evidence that it leads to lower average revenue. 
  334.6 Robustness 
Our finding that the discriminatory auction results in lower revenue and more 
collusion than the uniform-price auction with fixed supply is in direct contrast to GNR 
(1996) who report lower revenue and more collusion in the uniform-price auction.  It is 
important to recognize that our experimental design differs from that used in GNR (1996) 
in at least two respects.  The first is the number of bidders.  In our setting, five subjects 
bid in each round while GNR used 11.  The second is the complexity of the coordination 
problem due to the size of the strategy space: GNR allowed the subjects to bid at three 
possible prices while we allowed bidding at four.  It is natural to ask whether the 
difference in results was due to the number of subjects or the size of the strategy space. 
As a robustness check we tested whether a greater number of bidders participating 
in a uniform-price auction encouraged the coordination found by GNR.  We 
accomplished this by running three additional sessions with student subjects under our 
uniform-fixed setting using 10 subjects and 51 units for sale.  The results indicate that the 
greater number of bidders did not induce more collusion in the uniform-fixed auction.  
The average equilibrium price with 10 student bidders is 18.36 while the average 
equilibrium price with 5 student bidders is 17.77.  As a result, our conjecture is that the 
size of the strategy space is a more likely cause of the differences between our results. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
To examine multi-unit auction design we compare different auction formats in an 
experimental setting.  Individual and aggregate bid functions are found to differ 
significantly from theoretical predictions.  As a consequence of its greater susceptibility 
  34to collusion, in our experiments the discriminatory auction led to the lowest average 
revenue.  We find some evidence that a uniform-price auction with reducible supply can 
result in higher average revenue as compared with a uniform-price auction with a fixed 
supply, although the difference is not statistically significant.  Allocations in the 
discriminatory auctions were the most symmetric; however, this seems to derive from its 
susceptibility to collusion.  The uniform-price auction with fixed supply had the highest 
variation in revenue across auctions and the discriminatory auction had the lowest. 
Our revenue results are consistent with the empirical results of Umlauf (1993) 
who examined the Mexican T-bill auctions and found that a uniform-price auction with 
reducible supply led to a higher average revenue than did a discriminatory auction.  The 
results comparing revenue under the uniform-fixed versus the discriminatory auction 
contradict the GNR (1996) experimental findings but are consistent with empirical 
evidence in Feldman and Reinhart (1995).  Feldman and Reinhart studied the 
international monetary fund’s auction of gold from 1976 to 1980 and found that revenue 
in the uniform-price auctions was significantly larger.  Tenorio (1993) studied Zambia’s 
weekly auctions of foreign exchange from 1985 to 1987 and also concluded that uniform-
price auctions yield greater revenue than discriminatory auctions.  
The recent switch to a uniform-price mechanism by the U.S. Treasury is 
consistent with our result.
19  To the contrary, Belgium, France, Gambia, Mexico and 
Tanzania have all used a uniform-price format in the past and subsequently shifted to a 
discriminatory mechanism (Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997)).  However, any of these 
decisions may have resulted from objectives other than revenue maximization. 
                                                           
19 See the update of the Treasury Experience (October 1998). 
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  37Table 1 
Experimental Sessions and Summary Statistics 
The table lists the experimental sessions conducted according to the date, mechanism, and the subject types 
(students or professionals) and reports average prices and revenues. Bidding is permitted at four prices (20, 
19, 18, 17) and it is common knowledge that the resale value at the end of each auction is 20.   
 
Date Mechanism  Subjects  Mean  Stop-out 
Price 
Mean Price  Mean 
Revenue 
02-26  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Students  17.5  17.5  455 
04-03  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Students  18.5  18.5  481 
04-10  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Students  17.0  17.0  442 
10-21  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Students  18.9  18.9  490.3 
10-24  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Students  17.0  17.0  442 
07-15  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Professionals  19.8  19.8  514.4 
09-10  Uniform-Price Fixed Supply  Professionals  19.9  19.9  518.1 
   Mean  18.4  18.4  477.6 
          
04-12  Uniform-Price Reducible Supply  Students  19.2  19.2  499.6 
04-16  Uniform-Price Reducible Supply  Students  18.7  18.7  486.6 
04-17  Uniform-Price Reducible Supply  Students  17.0  17.0  442 
10-25  Uniform-Price Reducible Supply  Students  17.0  17.0  442 
07-15  Uniform-Price Reducible Supply  Professionals  19.5  19.5  506 
10-15  Uniform-Price Reducible Supply  Professionals  19.6  19.6  510.7 
   Mean  18.5  18.5  481.1 
          
04-26 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Students  17.0  17.0  442 
06-10 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Students  17.7  18.1  469.4 
07-17 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Students  17.1  17.9  465.3 
10-23 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Students  18.6  18.8  489.3 
10-25 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Students  17.0  17.0  442 
07-15 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Professionals  18.3  18.7  486.6 
09-18 Discriminatory-Price  Fixed  Supply Professionals  17.0  17.0  442 
   Mean  17.5  17.8  462.4 
 
 
  38Table 2 
Comparison of the Moments of Actual to Theoretical Bidding 
Discount is measured as the difference between the secondary market price and the quantity weighted average price 
of a bidder’s demand schedule. Standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis are calculated according to the equations 
given in section 4.2.  ** Significant at 5% level (* significant at 10% level) using a two tailed t-test where the 
average of each session is an observation, N=7 for uniform-fixed and discriminatory and N=6 for uniform-reducible. 
 
2-A – Individual’s Demand Curves 
 
Fixed Supply, Uniform-Price 
Moments  Theory
 20  Actual 
Discount 2.423  2.158 
Standard Deviation  1.18  0.24** 
Skewness 1.56  -0.12** 
Kurtosis 3.44  2.44 
 
Reducible Supply, Uniform-Price 
Moments Theory  Actual 
Discount 0 1.837** 
Standard Deviation  0  0.19** 
Skewness 0  0.03 
Kurtosis 1  1.82** 
 
Discriminatory 
Moments Theory    Actual 
Discount 1 2.435** 
Standard Deviation  0  0.086** 
Skewness 0  0.03 
Kurtosis 1  1.38* 
                                                           
20 In the table we present predictions of the equilibrium with 5 units demanded by each bidder at price 20 
and 21 units 17. For the equilibrium where each bidder demands 4 units at the price of 20, one unit at 19 
and 21units at 17 the predictions are: Standard Deviation = 1.12 Skewness = 1.64 and Kurtosis = 3.78. For 
the equilibrium with 3 units demanded at 20, 2 units demanded 19, and 21 units demanded 17 the 
theoretical predictions are: STD = 1.05, Skeweness = 1.71 and Kurtosis = 4.12. 
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2-B – Aggregate Demand Curves 
 
Fixed Supply, Uniform-Price 
Moments  Theory
21  Actual 
Discount 2.423  2.012 
Standard Deviation  1.18  0.44** 
Skewness 1.56  0.22** 
Kurtosis 3.44  2.35* 
 
Reducible Supply, Uniform-Price 
Moments Theory  Actual 
Discount 0  1.851
** 
Standard Deviation  0  0.42** 
Skewness 0  0.27 
Kurtosis 1  5.72* 
 
Discriminatory 
Moments Theory    Actual 
Discount 1  2.44
** 
Standard Deviation  0  0.21** 
Skewness 0  -0.09 
Kurtosis 1  4.06 
 
                                                           
21 In the table we present the theoretical results of the equilibrium with 25 units demanded at price 20 and 
105 units demanded at price 17.  For completeness, the theory predictions for the equilibrium: 15 units 
demanded at 20, 10 units demanded at 19, 0 demanded at 18 and 105 demanded at 17 are as follows: Std= 
1.0470, Skewness = 1.7091 and Kurtosis = 4.1169.  For the equilibrium: 20 units demanded at 20, 5 units 
demanded at 19, 0 demanded at 18 and 105 demanded at 17 the theoretical predictions are as follows: Std.  
Dev. = 1.1174, Skewness = 1.6402 and Kurtosis = 3.7789. 
 
  402-C – Aggregate Demand Curves- 6 Units 
 
Fixed Supply, Uniform-Price 
Moments  Theory
22   Actual 
Discount 0.5  2.353
** 
Standard Deviation  1.12  0.44** 
Skewness -1.79  -0.17** 
Kurtosis 4.2  1.99** 
 
Reducible Supply, Uniform-Price 
Moments Theory  Actual 
Discount 0  1.923
** 
Standard Deviation  0  0.28* 
Skewness 0  0.34 
Kurtosis 1  2.40** 
 
Discriminatory 
Moments Theory    Actual 
Discount 1  1.676
** 
Standard Deviation  0  0.14* 
Skewness 0  -0.01 
Kurtosis 1  2.66** 
 
                                                           
22 In the table we present the theoretical results of the equilibrium with 25 units demanded at price 20 and 5 
units demanded at price 17.  For completeness, the theory predictions for the equilibrium: 15 units 
demanded at 20, 10 units demanded at 19, 0 demanded at 18 and 5 demanded at 17 are as follows: Std. 
Dev. = 0.927, Skewness = -1.19 and Kurtosis = 3.75.  For the equilibrium: 20 units demanded at 20, 5 units 
demanded at 19, 0 demanded at 18 and 105 demanded at 17 the theoretical predictions are as follows: Std. 
Dev. = 1.11, Skewness = -1.43 and Kurtosis = 3.40. 
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Evolution of Revenue  
This table reports the evolution of revenue within experimental sessions and the standard deviation of 
revenue for each session.  Under the uniform-price mechanism with fixed supply the unique symmetric 
Pareto-dominant coalition-proof equilibria implies auctioneer‘s revenue of 442.  Under the uniform-price 
mechanism with reducible supply, there is a unique equilibrium in which the competitive outcome obtains 
(revenue equal to 520).   Under the discriminatory mechanism there is a unique equilibrium in undominated 
strategies in which auctioneer’s revenue equals 494.  
 
Panel A: Fixed Supply, Uniform-Price  
Date 
Subject 
Type  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  13  14  Mean
Std 
Dev 
02-26  Students  442 442 442 494 442 520 494 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  455  26.5 
04-10  Students  494 494 494 494 494 494 494 468 468 520 442 442 468 468  481  22.2 
04-3  Students  442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  442  0.0 
10-21  Students  442 468 494 520 520 494 494 494 520 494 494 468 494 468 490.3  22.5 
10-24  Students  442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  442  0.0 
07-15  Professionals 520 520 520 494 520 520 520 520 494 494 520 520 520 520 514.4  11.1 
10-09 Professionals  520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 520 494 520 520 518.1  6.9 
Mean   472 475 479 487 483 490 487 475 475 479 472 464 475 472 477.6  7.2 
Std Dev   38.1 35.9 36.3 32.6 39.3 35.0 32.6 35.9 35.9 36.3 38.1 31.6 35.9 35.0  35.6   
 
Panel B: Reducible Supply, Uniform-Price 
04-12  Students  442 468 520 520 520 494 520 494 494 494 520 520 494  494  499.6 23.2 
04-16  Students  442 442 442 494 494 494 520 494 494 494 494 520 494  494  486.6 25.9 
04-17  Students  442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  442 442  0.0 
10-25  Students  442 442 442  442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  442 442  0.0 
07-15 Professionals  520  520  520  480 494 494 494 520 520 520 520 494 494  494 506  15.0 
10-15  Professionals 520 520 520  520 520 520 520 494 494 494 494 494 520  520  510.7 12.9 
Mean    468 472  481 483 485 481 490 481 481 481 485 485 481 481 481.1 5.4 
Std Dev   40.3 38.3  42.7 35.3 35.5 31.8 38.3 31.8 31.8 31.8 35.5 35.5 31.8 31.8 35.2  
 
Panel C: Discriminatory 
04-26  Students  442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  0.0 
06-10  Students  494 494 494 494 494 494 488 442 442 468 442 442 442 442  469.4  25.5 
07-17  Students  468 494 494 442 474 486 458 494 494 442 442 442 442 442  465.3  23.4 
10-23  Students  469 469 478 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 494  489.3  9.6 
10-25  Students  442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  0.0 
07-15  Professionals 446 473 494 494 444 494 499 494 494 499 494 494 499 494  486.6  18.7 
09-18  Professionals 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442 442  0.0 
Mean    458 465 469 464 462 471 466 464 464 461 457 457 458  457 462.4 4.6 
Std Dev   20.1 23.6 26.3 27.8 24.9 26.9 26.3 27.8 27.8 25.9 25.4 25.4 26.6  25.4  25.7   
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Table 4 
Auctioneer’s Revenue by Mechanism 
 
We estimate the following model (OLS) in order to examine mechanism dependent differences in 
auctioneer’s revenue: 
 
REVENUE = b1 + b2UF + b3UR + b4PROF + e 
 
In order to control for within-session experience effects, we analyze the last four auctions from 
each session. These are the auctions most likely to represent equilibrium outcomes (see Figure 5). 
We calculate the average revenue over the last four auctions and then use each session mean as a 
single data point.  UF is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 in uniform-price fixed 
supply sessions and 0 otherwise. UR is an equivalent indicator variable for uniform-price fixed 
supply sessions.  PROF is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 for sessions with 
fixed-income professionals as subjects, and 0 otherwise. The indicator for the discriminatory-
price mechanism is suppressed. Therefore the mean for the discriminatory-price sessions is 
captured by the intercept after controlling for PROF, and the estimated coefficients for UF and 
UR represent differences between these session means and the mean for the discriminatory-price 
sessions.  We estimate the model with all sessions, and with sessions where fewer than 50% of 
the auctions result in the perfectly collusive outcome.  This is a robustness test since group 
dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion - independent of the 

























































 Table 5 
Herfindahl - Hirschman Index for Allocation of Units 
The table reports the Herfindahl - Hirschman index for each of the 14 auctions in each experimental 
session. The index is calculated by squaring the percentage allocation of each bidder and then summing the 
squared allocations.  If allocations are perfectly symmetric, the value of the index is 2000 while if a single 
bidder receives the entire allocation the value is 10,000.  The unique equilibrium for both the uniform-price 
reducible supply and discriminatory mechanisms implies perfectly symmetric allocations and hence an 
index value of 2000.  Under the uniform-price fixed supply mechanism there are many equilibria with both 
symmetric and asymmetric allocations. 
 
Panel A: Uniform-Price Fixed Supply 
Session  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14  Mean 
Std 
Dev 
02-26  2000 2000 2500 10000  8038 3769 3817 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  3295  2537 
04-10  2667 3285 4003 4385 3902 3500 2840 6893 5594 5396 2546 2613 5735 6037  4243  1448 
04-3  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000  0 
10-21  3395 2923  6110  3169 4549 3050 2548 3487 3469 3734 3750 10000 4181 6302  4333  1970 
10-24  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000  0 
07-15  4941 4463 7619 7313 3965 3930 3859 4050 6674 3008 3410 4054 3887 3501  4620  1483 
10-09  2732 2990 2966 3899 2814 3005 3126 3206 3143 2814 3158 6541 2790 2690  3277  987 
Mean  2819 2809 3885 4681 3895 3036 2884 3377 3554 2993 2695 4173 3228 3504  3395  590 
Std Dev  1071  910  2190 2960 2080 785  770 1758 1885 1246  743  3060 1434 1901  1081  
                            
       Panel B: Uniform-Price Reducible Supply          
04-12  2000  10000  7686  10000 7290 2003 8671 2027 5000  3553 4692  4491 2167 2119 5121 3055 
04-16  3575  6246  6226  3640 7290 2962 5495 2003 3744  2880 5355  2990 4275 4113 4342 1546 
04-17  2000  2000  2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 0 
10-25  2000  2000  2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 0 
07-15  4077  5022  9482  8521 4017 2497 4207 4070 5597  4068 4063  3228 4270 4469 4828 1916 
10-15  4132  4813  5081  4687 5339 6101 5850 6253 2820  4065 3973  4050 3775 2951 4564 1079 
Mean  2964  5014  5413  5141 4656 2926 4704 3086 3527  3094 3680  3127 3081 2942  3811  984 
Std Dev  1074  2986  3026  3383 2402 1602 2551 1769 1527  953 1393  1028 1140 1110  1853  
                            
       Panel C: Discriminatory             
04-26  2000  2000  2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000  2000  0 
06-10  3798  2550  2249  2448 2017 2010 6914 2000 2000  10000 2000  2000 2000 2000  3142  2381 
07-17  6745  10000  5027  2000 4518 3724 4518 5000 2926  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000  3890  2340 
10-23  9257  9257  10000  2523 2238 2162 2373 2000 2000  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000  3701  3154 
10-25  2000  2000  2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000  2000  0 
07-15  2124  3619  6197  2473 2031 7290 2193 2422 2067  2225 2151  2067 2120 2017  2928  1681 
09-18  2000  2000  2000  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000  2000 2000  2000 2000 2000  2000  0 
Mean  3989  4489  4210  2206 2400 3027 3143 2489 2142  3175 2022  2010 2017 2002  2809  881 
Std Dev  2908  3564  3072  258  938 1984 1894 1118  347  3011  57  25  45  6  822   
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 Table 6 
Allocation Symmetry by Mechanism 
 
We estimate the following model (OLS) in order to examine mechanism-dependent differences in 
the symmetry of allocations:   
 
HH = b1 + b2UF + b3UR + b4PROF + e 
 
Our measure of symmetry is the Herfindahl - Hirschman index (HH). The index is calculated by 
squaring the percentage allocation of each bidder and then summing the squared allocations.   We 
multiply this sum by 10,000 to remove decimals.  If allocations are perfectly symmetric, the value 
of the index is 2000 while if a single bidder receives the entire allocation the value is 10,000.  In 
order to control for within-session experience effects, we analyze the last four auctions from each 
session. These are the auctions most likely to represent equilibrium outcomes (see Figure 5). We 
calculate the average level of HH over the last four auctions in each session and then use each 
session mean as a single data point.  UF is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 in 
uniform-price fixed supply sessions and 0 otherwise. UR is an equivalent indicator variable for 
uniform-price fixed supply sessions.  PROF is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 
for sessions with fixed-income professionals as subjects, and 0 otherwise. The indicator for the 
discriminatory-price mechanism is suppressed. Therefore the mean for the discriminatory-price 
sessions is captured by the intercept after controlling for PROF, and the estimated coefficients for 
UF and UR  represent differences between these session means and the mean for the 
discriminatory-price sessions.  We estimate the model with all sessions, and with sessions where 
fewer than 50% of the auctions result in the perfectly collusive outcome.  This is a robustness test 
since group dynamics and cohort effects may play a role in achieving perfect collusion - 




























































 Figure 1 
Average Number of Submitted Price-Quantity Combinations 
This figure shows the percentage of auctions under each mechanism in which a given number of 










































  46Figure 2 
Theoretical equilibrium demand curves and the actual average aggregate demands for each 
mechanism. 
 















































  47Figure 3 
Actual average aggregate demand curves across mechanisms. 
 
 
















Figure 3B: Average Aggregate Demands Uniform-















Mean Aggregate Inverse Demand 
Prices Discriminatory  Uniform-Fix  Uniform-Reducible 
20  0.15  9.97  15.08 
19  32.02  30.95  59.32 
18  39.85  43.55  72.83 
17  129.54  129.58  128.65 
 
  48Figure 4 
The Distribution of Allocations 
This figure shows how the symmetry of the allocation of units to subjects differs across 
mechanisms by depicting the frequency with which allocations to a bidder in an auction occurred 
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  49Figure 5 
Experience Effects 
The following panels show the influence of experience on auctioneer’s revenue and the symmetry of 
allocations (Herfindahl-Hirshman Index) by comparing results from later auctions with global averages. 
The first data grouping is the global average for all 14 auctions under each mechanism, the second data 
grouping is the average for auctions 2 through 14, the third is the average for auctions 3 through 14 and so 
on.. Under the Discriminatory-price mechanism (D), auctioneer’s revenue declines monotonically as 
bidders gain experience and the allocations converge to the perfectly symmetric by auction 11. Under the 
uniform-fixed mechanism (UF), there is no significant change in symmetry while auctioneer’s revenue 
trends downward. Under the uniform-reducible mechanism (UR), the reverse is true: symmetry increases 


























































































































































This is an experiment in economic decision-making.  The experiment consists of several rounds. 
At the end of each round your payoff for that round will be calculated. At the end of the 
experiment, your payoff from each round will be added up and this sum will determine your 
payoff for the experiment. Your payoff will be made with funds provided through grants by 
various institutions. Please feel free to earn as much of this money as possible. Everything 
contained in these instructions and everything you hear in this session is an accurate 
representation of this experiment. Be sure to ask any questions that you may have during this 
instruction period, and ask for assistance, if needed, at any time. All subjects receive the same 
instructions. 
 
There are four parts in today's experiment: 
1. These instructions 
2. The trading game consisting of a random number of auctions 
3.  A questionnaire 
4.  The (private) payment of earnings 
 
THE TRADING GAME OVERVIEW 
In this experiment you will be required to bid for units of a good which we will call widgets. 
There will be 26 widgets available to all players. The resale value of each widget at the end of 
the auction is Fr. 20. You will be submitting a schedule of bids. This schedule indicates the 
number of widgets you are willing to buy at a given price level. The possible price levels will be 
Fr. 17, Fr. 18, Fr. 19, and Fr. 20. Once all schedules have been submitted, the computer will 
assign widgets to players submitting the highest bids until up to the available supply of 26 
widgets is exhausted (if it increases the revenue from selling widgets, the computer may 
automatically sell fewer than 26 widgets). All the players will pay the same price (clearing price) 
for each widget he/she is allocated. At the end of each auction your cash balance will increase by 
20 francs for each widget you hold, so you will earn profits on each widget you purchase at a 
clearing price less than 20 francs. There will be multiple auctions. The exact number will be 
randomly chosen. At the end of the experiment your balance in francs will be converted to cash 
  51(1 franc = $0.10), and you will be paid that amount in cash. Only you and the assistant that pays 
you will learn your earnings from today’s session. 
 
DETAILS 
There will be 26 widgets available for sale. Your resale value for each widget is 20 francs. (This 
means that after the auction your balance will increase by 20 francs for each widget that you 
hold, less what you paid for each widget). Prior to each auction, you will be required to submit 
via computer a schedule of bids. This schedule indicates the number of widgets you are willing 
to buy (including zero) at each possible price level. The possible price levels will be Fr. 17, Fr. 
18, Fr. 19, and Fr. 20 and the sum of all of your bids may not exceed 26 units. Once each 
participant has submitted his/her schedule of bids, the computer will calculate the highest price at 
which all 26 widgets can be sold and will allocate widgets to players that submit bids that are 
equal to or higher than this price. The computer will also calculate the revenue generated if the 
number of widgets actually sold is less than 26 and it will choose to sell the quantity (less than or 
equal to 26) that maximizes the revenue. The price paid for each widget will be equal to the 
clearing price.  The market-clearing price will be the highest price at which the total 
demand for widgets summed across all bidders is equal to 26 (or the highest price at which 
a smaller quantity of widgets chosen by the computer can be sold). 
There will be several rounds of bidding. Only you will know your actual bids, allocations, and 
payoffs in each round, however all the participants will know the eventual clearing price of each 
round. You have the option to change your bids from one auction to another. The computer will 
end the experiment after some random number of rounds of bidding. Only the computer knows 
this number of rounds.  
 
The Calculation of Your Payoffs 
 
Your payoffs from each auction will be equal to the difference between your resale value for 
each widget (Fr.20) and the clearing price times the number of widgets you are allocated. At the 
end of each round your payoffs will be calculated. At the end of each experiment, the payoffs of 
each round will be added up. The sum of your round by round payoffs will determine your 
payoff from the experiment.  
  52After the experiment is ended, your cumulative dollar payoff will be determined using the 
following formula:   $ Payoffs  = Balance in Francs * 0.10 
Each participant will learn only his/her own final cash payment. 
 
COMMUNICATION RULES 
Before and after each round you may discuss strategies with the other players for about 1 minute. 
However you are required to remain seated behind your computer screen at all times. You are 
explicitly not allowed to:  
1)  Make physical threats of any kind or verbally abuse other players 
2)   Agree to share profits after the experiment 
3)  Look at the computer screen of any other player 
4)   Ask other participants how much they have earned when the experiment has ended. 
 
The following examples are for illustrative purposes only. They are not intended to 
be suggested as “best” strategies and simply demonstrate the implications of a 




Consider a game with 5 bidders: A, B, C, D and E. Suppose they submit the following schedules: 
  
 Bidders 
PRICE A B C D  E 
Demand Cumulative   
Demand 
Supply
20  11 0  5  0  0  16  16  26 
19  5 0 3 2  0  10  26  26 
18  5 0 8 6 18 37  63  26 
17  5 26  10 18 8  67  130  26 
  
The demand at each price is the sum of the demands of bidders A, B, C, D, and E. For example 
the demand at price 20 is equal to 11+0+5+0+0=16. The cumulative demand is equal to the total 
demand at that price and all higher prices. For example the cumulative demand at the price of 19 
is 16 (Demand at 20) + 10 (Demand at 19) = 26. The market-clearing price is the highest price at 
  53which the cumulative demand equals the supply. In this case, the cumulative demand equals the 
supply at price equal 19. 
 
The allocation and profit of the players is as follows: 
 
PRICE A  B  C  D  E 
Allocation  16 0  8  2  0 
Profit  16*(20-19)=16  0  8*(20-19)=8 2*(20-19)=2  0 
 
Since the value of a widget for each player is 20, each player makes a profit for each unit that 
he/she bought at a price below 20. Since in this example the clearing price is 19, each participant 
makes a profit of 1 Fr. times the number of units he/she is allocated. 
 
Note: At the end of each round, you will learn the total demand at each price and your own 
payoff, but you will not learn the bids or payoffs of any other participant. 
 
EXAMPLE 2 
The following example illustrates a case where cumulative demand does not exactly equal 
supply at any price, and shows how the widgets are allocated if this occurs. 
 
 Bidders 
PRICE A  B  C  D E
Demand Cumulative   
Demand 
Supply
20  11  0 5 0 0 16  16  26 
19  5 0 3 2 8 18  34  26 
18  5 0 8 6 10 29  63  26 
17  5  26 10 18 8 67  130  26 
 
In this case, the market-clearing price is 19. Each player will be allocated his/her demand at price 
20 and some of his/her demand at price = 19. Each player’s allocation at 19 will depend on how 
large his/her bid was at that price: the larger the bid the larger the allocation as follows. Player A 
bids for 5 units at a price of 19. Since these 5 units represent 5/18 or 27.7% of demand at 
  54price=19, this player receives 27.7% of the number of widgets necessary to make cumulative 
demand at price = 19 equal 26 (the supply of widgets). Since 10 widgets will be allocated from 
bids at price = 19, player A receives 2.8 of these widgets (27.7% of 10 rounded to the tenth). 
Player A will also receive his/her entire bid of 10 at price = 20. 
Note that the computer could increase the market-clearing price to 20 by reducing the quantity of 
widgets sold to 16, but will not do so in this case because this would reduce revenue (26*19 > 
16*20). 
 
The allocation and profit of the players is as follows: 
PRICE A  B  C  D  E 
Allocation  13.8  0  6.7 1.1 4.4 





The following figures are for illustrative purposes only. They are not intended to be suggested as 
“best” strategies and simply demonstrate the computer interface. 
 
Figure 1 below shows the first screen you will see when the game starts.  The computer 
screen is divided into three main areas: The “Bid Frame” (large area on the left-upper 
corner), the “History Graph” (thin rectangular area on the right-upper corner) and the 
“History Table” (wide rectangular area on the bottom of the screen).   
 











The Bid Frame is the interface that allows you to input your bids at each price. The “A” 
indicates your maximum demand is 26. This is also illustrated in the graph by the blue 
vertical line (marked A’). Point “B” reminds you that your resale value for each widget 
will be Fr. 20. The white fields marked with “C” are where you will input your bids at the 
different prices.  Notice that there is one field for each of the four allowed prices (that is 
Fr. 20, Fr. 19, Fr. 18 and Fr. 17).  You must submit your bid at each respective price by 
typing a non-negative integer between 0 and 26. By default the computer positions your 
cursor in the Fr. 20 Field.  You can move to the next field (Fr. 19) by pressing Tab on 
your keyboard or by clicking the field with the left button of your mouse.  
 
  56Figure 2 below shows you how the process just described works.  You will notice that as 
you input your demand schedule in the mentioned fields, the computer will draw a 
demand curve (demand graph).  It will look like the downward sloping ladder graph 






Note that the demand curve only goes as far as the maximum demand allowed (26).  You 
are allowed to bid for less than this amount but not more. Once you are done inputting 
your bids, you submit them by clicking the “Submit” button on the screen with your 
mouse, or by “tabbing” into it with your keyboard and pressing the “Enter” key.  
 
 
Once all subjects have submitted their bids, the results for the auction will be displayed. 
The results for the round just played will always be displayed in the same area as the 
“Bid Frame” (the large area on the right-upper corner of the screen).  Notice however that 
  57the label of the Frame has changed to “Auction Results.”  Figure 3 shows the 
hypothetical results of the first round in our example.  The “Auction Results” Window 
will show your original demand curve, the market clearing price with a dotted blue line, 
and will highlight with green the portion of your demand curve which was filled (in the 







The “History Table” gives you a numerical summary of the round’s results. It tells you 
the number of widgets you were allocated, the market-clearing price, the percentage of 










Figure 4 shows how the “History Graph” displays results from previous rounds. In this 
illustration, even though the game has already been played three rounds, the graph (upper 
right-hand corner) is showing the results of the first one. Please notice how the “Auction 
Results” Graph and the “History Graph” differ: the “Auction Results” Graph shows the 
results of the last round played (in this case round 3) and the “History Graph” is showing 
those of the first round.  
 
At any point in the game you can recall the “History Graph” from past rounds by double 
clicking the desired round in the “History Table.”  Notice in Figure 4 that although the 
“History Table” depicts the results of all the rounds played, the first round is highlighted.  
  59This means that the “History Graph” shown corresponds to that highlighted round.  By 
default, after each round, the “History Table” will highlight the last round played, but you 
can change this at any point of the game by highlighting the desired round. When a game 
lasts for more rounds than the “History Table” can show in its limited area, a scroll bar 
will appear to the right of the table. This allows you to view the results from any period.  
 
The computer will randomly determine the last auction. When this occurs a screen will be 
displayed that reports your initial cash balance (zero) and your profits at the end of the 
game. If you wish you may write down your profits, but you need not do so; the 
experimenter has this record and will pay you your exact earnings in private. Finally, 
press “Enter” with the keyboard (or click “Ok” using the mouse) and your screen will go 
blank. If you don’t do this, the screen will automatically go blank after 60 seconds.  




1.  Suppose you bid for 1 widget at a price of Fr. 20, 10 widgets at a price of Fr. 19, 2 
widgets at a price of Fr. 18, and 13 widgets at a price of Fr. 17. Suppose you receive 
all the widgets you bid for at a price greater than or equal to Fr.18, and none of the 
widgets you bid for at a price of Fr. 17. What is your profit in Francs for the period? 
 
2.  Assume the following set of bids. 
 
 Bidders 
PRICE A  B  C  D E
Demand Cumulative   
Demand 
Supply
20  1 0 5 8 1 15  15  26 
19  2 0 5 0 1 8  23  26 
18  10  0 5 3 12 30  53  26 
17  13 26 11 15 12 77  130  26 
 
a.  What is the market-clearing price? 
 
b.  What is the profit of player B? 
 
c. What is the profit of player D? 
  60